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Abstract 
 
The issue of public investments became a very challenging subject for public decision makers since it 
incorporates the question of state performance, the quality of public finance and their effects on 
growth.The quality of public finance (QPF) is a multidimensional concept. It may be regarded as 
representing all the arrangements and operations regarding the financial politics that sustain the 
macroeconomic objectives, particularly the long-term economic growth. Financial policies at 
European level highlight the fact that a concentration of the public expenses in areas that stimulate the 
economic growth and a more efficient use of the public resources are key methods for sustaining the 
economic growth. The empirical proofs seem to support the assumption according to which certain 
types of public expenses can supply incentives and other can negatively influence the economic growth. 
The paper tries to reveal the effects of capital spending on economic growth (GDP per capita) for the 
European Union member states. The gross domestic product per capita and the capital expenses 
(functional classification of public expenses -  “COFOG”) have been obtained by considering the 
Eurostat statistics, the measurement unit for the dependent variable and for the independent one is the 
EURO, while the period of analyze is of 7 years ( 2000-2006) 
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I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUD 
 
Discussing the connection between public investments and economic growth primarily means 
clarifying the concept of “quality of public finance”. 
The quality of public finance (QPF) is a multidimensional concept. It may be regarded as 
representing all the arrangements and operations of financial policies that sustain the macroeconomic 
objectives, particularly the long-term economic growth. Thereby, the QPF does not comprise only the 
policies that ensure consistent budgetary positions and long-term sustainability, but also those that 
increase the production capabilities and improve the adjustment of economy to eventual shocks. In 
order to achieve these results, the public resources and spending policies must be used in an efficient 
and effective manner, supporting efficiently operating markets.   
The different dimensions of the QPF, in a framework oriented towards economic growth, 
indicate that their effect on the economic growth can take place through 6 transmission channels
1
:  
(i) the size of the public sector;  
(ii) (ii) the level and sustainability of the financial policies;  
(iii) the structure and efficiency of the public expenses;  
(iv) the structure and efficiency of the public incomes; 
(v) fiscal governance – the fiscal administration (i.e. the contents of tax regulations, 
procedures, organization of institutions) can have an effect on all 4 dimensions 
mentioned above.  
(vi) In addition, the public finance can influence the operating manner of various markets as 
well as the economic environment.  
The conceptualization of the QPF as a multidimensional framework is compulsory in order to 
reflect the complex relations with the economic growth. A one-dimensional approach, such as the 
exclusive focus on public expenses’ influence on productivity increase, would be oversimplified by not 
considering the heavier tax burden these expenses require. Therefore, a multidimensional perspective 
helps avoid the “problem of omitting some variables”. It also highlights the fact that pursuing the 
requirements of the QPF, imposed by the European institutions, may be helpful in fulfilling the growth 
objective. For example, a higher efficiency of public spending can facilitate the assurance of the fiscal 
sustainability - directly through additional funds or indirectly through a more significant economic 
growth, in case this efficiency resulting in a lower fiscal pressure. In a similar way, a less distorted 
structure of the incomes can have an effect on the economic growth and can also contribute to the 
attainment of sustainability.  
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 Even though it does not use the term of “quality of the public finance”, the European Central Bank (2001) uses a similar 
classification of the relations between the fiscal policies and the economic growth.  
Table 1 
The economic growth and the quality of the public finance: indicators chosen for the EU and 
OECD countries 
 All countries 
1980-1989 
All countries 
1990-2005 
EU countries - 27 
1990-2005 
 Low 
growth 
Significant 
growth 
Low 
growth 
Significant 
growth 
Low 
growth 
Significant 
growth 
The mean growth rate of 
GDP per citizen  
2.3% 3.3% 1.3% 3.3% 1.6% 3.0% 
1. The size of the administrative sector 
Governmental expenses 41% 40.1% 40.8% 37.8% 48.6% 42.1% 
2. The fiscal deficits and their sustainability  
The size of the deficit -3.8% -3.9% -3.1% -0.1% -3.2% -3.0% 
The variability of the 
deficit 
-1.1% -1.0% -1.1% -0.4% -1.5% -0.9% 
Public debt 50.6% 63.2% 73.8% 57.3% 65.0% 49.8% 
3. The structure of the governmental expenses 
Consumption 27.9% 25.7% 26.8% 21.4% 26.5% 23.5% 
Investments 2.7% 3.9% 2.9% 3.7% 2.4% 3.5% 
4. The structure of incomes 
Fiscal lever afferent to the 
salary incomes  
35.5% 32.1% 34.7% 29.6% 44.8% 39.6% 
Indirect charges 9.7% 9.4% 10.0% 11.9% 13.1% 12.2% 
Direct charges 12.7% 12.5% 12.9% 10.2% 12.9% 10.1% 
5. Fiscal governance       
General index of fiscal regulation    0.0 0.0 
Fiscal index of the governmental expenditures    0.1 -0.1 
6. Business environment (Fraser Index) 
The level of regulation 5.5 5.5 6.1 6.4 5.6 5.6 
The level of credit 
regulation 
7.3 7.4 7.7 8.0 7.7 8.4 
The level of the labor 4.3 5.3 5.1 5.4 5.0 5.6 
market regulation  
The level of commerce 
regulation  
  6.3 6.8 6.4 7.0 
Sources: Eurostat, OECD and the Fraser Institute. 
2
 
 
Performance-based budgeting (PBB) has as purpose increasing the quality of public finance 
through strengthening the connection between budgetary resources and their results and benefits. The 
mechanism is to transfer the management from controlling entries to a greater focus on results.   
The experiences of several countries show that implementing a budgeting approach based on 
performance, that is usually part of the complex reform programs of public administration, may be 
difficult. The issues occurring imply defeating a resistance often adverse towards organization changes, 
obtaining on time the data connected to economic performance and, in general, the measuring degree of 
performance (see Curristine, 2005), as well as the bottlenecks concerning avoiding the creation of 
distorted incentives (for example, an over-focus on objectives easily quantified (Smith, 1995)). This 
explains the fact that very few countries implemented PBB completely and, usually, if this procedure 
exists, it was made only for chosen areas (usually health and the higher education). Thus, most 
countries use a budgeting form that takes into account the performance, and those making decisions 
take in consideration data concerning the performance, but there is no direct connection between them 
and the budgetary allocation.  
The comparison concerning the manner the European Union member states use the budgetary 
procedure relying on performance is described below and it is founded on data provided by OECD and 
World Bank until 2007. While the database shows the manner used by countries for institutionalizing 
their approach, it can suggest only a vague indication concerning the degree to which performance is 
due to national organizations. The main results are summarized in figures 1 through 4. The budgeting 
based on performance is used in 20 member states of the European Union included in databases, 
(Figure 1). Member states may use evaluation reports, different manners for measuring performance, 
references to performance targets or benchmarking for analyzing the non-financial performance of the 
government, but just a few use all the above. Especially benchmarking is not very wide spread. Most 
                                                 
2 Note: The mean values are balanced (GDP expressed by the standard purchasing power). All variables are measured as 
percentage of the GDP, less the fiscal lever, the variables of fiscal governance and the variables of the economic 
environment.  The percentage of the fiscal lever includes the social contributions of the employers. The variables of the 
economic environment reflect the existing structural rigidity on the labor and capital market and in the economic 
environment and they are taken from the Fraser database. A high value of the Fraser index indicates a high flexibility of 
each market analyzed in item 6 of the table. The variability of the deficit is measured by means of the standard deviation of 
the deficit (or of the surplus), divided to the mean value of the deficit for each country. The non-EU countries are AU, CA, 
IS, JP, KO, NO, CH, NZ, US.  
countries use a combination of measures for outputs and outcomes as indicators of performance and / 
or objectives, showing on one hand the difficulties occurring as regards identifying some measurable 
outcomes in all sectors and, on the other hand, the try to avoid using just indicators relying on results 
that might lead to loosing off sight the benefits of fiscal policies that were considered as main 
objectives at the beginning. These practices are according to the OECD guidebooks (2007f) concerning 
“Designing and developing budgetary systems that use information connected to performance”. 
The formal responsibility for setting out the performance targets belongs to the relevant 
minister or to the government on its whole in most member states (Figure 2). Only Austria and 
Denmark state explicitly the administrative manager of the ministry concerned as being officially liable 
for setting out goals, although in practice this is valid also in several member states. In most countries, 
the minister of finance is involved informally in setting out performance targets, alone or in 
collaboration with each single ministry concerned. In Great Britain, the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor in the ministry of finance share the responsibility for setting out objectives in practice. In 
most countries, the relevant minister for a sector is responsible for fulfilling the objectives, except for 
Poland where the person responsible is the prime minister, and Denmark where the general manager is 
liable for this. In Finland, the relevant minister and the agency manager are both responsible for 
fulfilling the objectives because the ministry and the agency are partners in a performance agreement.  
The authorities using most frequently the budgeting based on performance are the Central 
Budgetary Authority, the Ministry of Finance or the ministry concerned (Figure 3). They take into 
account the performance targets that are available at the time of setting out the budget. Within the 
national parliaments, using the performance objectives is less frequent, just Finland and France and, to 
a lower degree Slovakia and Sweden, taking into account regularly the performance objectives within 
budgetary and sector commissions. When wondering to what degree the budget is set out according to 
the performance objectives, the European Union member states have very different practices. Some of 
them involve performance target levels for all expenses (FR, SK, SE), while others do not use any 
performance target level at the time of setting the budget (AT, DK, LU, PL, SI).  
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Figure 1- Type of performance information produced to assess the Government´s non-financial 
performance 
Source: OECD, 2007 
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Figure 2 - The responsibility for setting out the performance target levels 
Source:  OECD, 2007 
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Figure 3 - Using information connected to performance for taking budgetary decisions 
Note: The frequency ranges between 1 = almost never (0-20%) and 5 – almost always (81-100%). 
Source: OECD, 2007 
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Figure 4 - Consequences of not fulfilling the performance target levels 
Note: The frequency ranges between 1 = almost never (0-20%) and 5 – almost always (81-100%). 
Source: OECD, 2007 
 
After analyzing the consequences, penalties and costs due to missing the performance targets, it 
is confirmed the weak connection between budgeting relying on performance and allocating funds 
(Figure 4). In general, in the 20 member states taken into account as regards this matter, a budget 
diminishing takes place very rare (just in 25% of the cases missing the performance target leads to 
budget diminishes). Other disciplinary penalties, such as lowering salaries or negative consequences for 
developing the carrier for the responsible employees, as well as giving up expense, are used also rarely. 
A closer surveillance under the form of an intense monitoring is the most frequent consequence, used 
in 50% of the circumstances when the performance targets are missed.  
Given the difficulty of connecting directly the measurements linked to performance and the 
budgetary allocations, using some more complex assessment mechanisms is a key element in 
evaluating programs and sectors. Within all member states, the relevant ministries are the ones 
developing or authorizing most types of assessment. Involving the legislative power in initiating 
assessments takes place rarer and it is limited to a few countries (LU, NL, PL, FI, EL and FR). 
Also countries that institutionalized PBB to the highest degree focus mostly on taking into 
account performances, and not direct budgeting according to performances.  
During the last years, when the financial policies of the European Union were settled, it was 
highlighted that a concentration of the public spending in areas that stimulate the economic growth 
corroborated with a more efficient use of public funds are key ways for sustaining the economic 
growth. The strategy established in Lisbon for the economic growth and employment refers explicitly 
to both objectives. The role played by the structure of the governmental expenditures was studied in 
great detail and the particular experiences of the countries were analyzed in order to come to a 
constructive conclusion in the area of financial policies. 
3
 It has been widely accepted that public 
investment ( capital expenditures) is definitely enhancing economical growth.  Performance based 
budgeting should determine a growth of those expenses which stimulate growth.  
 
II. EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
While the theory offers a framework for identifying the public spending categories that 
stimulate economic growth, actually such an assessment is difficult to be made. Theoretically, the 
public spending used for financing public goods and for mitigating market failures as well as the 
negative externalities promote economic growth. In an adequate manner, the designations of public 
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  The European Commission (2003, 2004), the studies of Deroose and Kastrop (2008). 
spending might be, for example, creating the public infrastructure, ensuring the access to loans for 
households and small and medium-sized companies facing liquidity problems (by subsidizing interest 
rates), enabling them to invest in human capital and in assets, or to create a social protection system if 
the market cannot provide it through its own mechanisms. All these types of public spending can lead 
to increasing the labour and capital productivity.  
Generally, as reality shows, the public investments have a higher marginal productivity as 
against the public consumption. Still, these examples show also that a basic condition for classifying 
the public spending as “lucrative” is the existence of public goods, market failures and externalities, as 
well as the capacity of public consumption to solve these problems without creating great economy 
distortions (Gerson, 1998). Despite these methodological difficulties, empirical studies have identified 
certain types of governmental expenses leading to a higher economic growth. Consequently, the 
governmental expenses were divided according to their economic or functional classification (or, in 
some cases, in a combination of these ones).  
When the economic classification was used, the results of public investments were mixed. 
(Gerson, 1998), who mentions a number of empirical studies, states that the relation between total 
public investments and the economic growth was found only in few cases. More recent studies have, 
also, reached inconclusive results. For example, Romero de Avila and Strauch (2003) argue that the 
public investments have a positive effect on the growth in the European Union, while Afonso and 
Furceri (2008) did not find that public investments have a significant impact in explaining the EU and 
OECD economic growth. On the other hand, the public transfers and the consumption are usually 
believed as having a negative effect on the economic growth. There are two possible explanations for 
these results. Firstly, the percentage of public investments in EU is relatively low, reaching 
approximately 3% of the GDP, which limits its potential effect on the long-term economic growth. On 
the other hand, the public consumption has a high percentage of 21%. Consequently, the empirical 
studies including both variables in the regressions made on the economic growth have better chances to 
obtain the negative result of the administrative system size than the one due to the structure of 
governmental expenses. Secondly, it seems that properly oriented governmental expenses, and not 
particularly general public investments, stimulate the economic growth. This result is reached by 
studies combining the economic and functional classification and emphasizing that investments 
performed in certain areas, especially in transportation and communications, seem to be connected 
systematically to a higher economic growth (see Gerson, 1998).  
Figure 5 shows the data for the European Union and for the non-EU similar countries during 
1995-2007, indicating, caeteri paribus, a bi-varied slightly-positive correlation between the total public 
investments and the economic growth.  
By using a functional classification, the types of public spending that boost economic growth 
vary a lot according to the sample used. Some studies revealed that just education, research-
development and the public infrastructure spending stimulate economic growth, while others include 
also health, public order, safety and environment protection spending (European Commission, 2003, 
2004).  
For illustration purposes, we have used a more limited composition of efficient expenses in 
figure 6 (research-development, public transportation and education). In this case, the percentage in the 
total basic public consumption varies between 13% in Germany (among the countries for which 
complete data were available) and 24% in Latvia. There can be seen that most transition economies 
allocate a high part of public resources to these areas which might partially reflect their need to 
diminish the gap between them and the other states, as well as the support obtained through fiscal 
cohesion programs.  
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Figure 5 - Public investments and economic growth in the industrialized EU members states and 
in EU non - members, 1995-2007 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 6 -Percentage of lucrative public expenses in the total public expenses, 2005 
Note:  2005 or more recent available data 
Source: Eurostat 
 
On a whole, the empirical proofs seem to support the assumption according to which certain 
types of public expenses can supply incentives and other can negatively influence the economic 
growth. The second case is when the expenses are not directed adequately and their financing leads to 
creating negative externalities (through high levels of the public debt or through taxation and 
distortion-leading charges). Therefore, a simple reallocation of the public resources cannot be a 
sufficient strategy for improving the quality of public expenses, but it must be accompanied by a more 
efficient use of public resources which will also allow diminishing the size of public sector and that 
will create fiscal space for other expenses. 
 
III. ECOOMETRIC STUDY COCERIG THE IFLUECE OF CAPITAL EXPESES 
O THE ECOOMIC GROWTH  
 
 The dependant variable used in the analysis is the gross domestic products per capita; the 
independent variable is the capital expenses. The capital expenses are considered as lucrative expenses 
(following several analyses made by the World Bank and by other economic institutions), and therefore 
they should positively influence economic growth. The gross domestic product per capita and the 
capital spending (functional classification of public expenses -  “COFOG”) have been obtained by 
considering the Eurostat statistics and the measurement unit for the dependent variable and for the 
independent one is the EUR. The analysis interval is 2000-2006 (given the availability of time series) 
and concerns 26 European Union member states (25 European Union old member states and Romania). 
The econometric model achieved is a pool data type.  
tiittiti
XY εβα +×+=
      (1)
 
The (simplified) model will be the following: 
 
εβ += ExppubGDPcapita        (2) 
Where: 
GDPcapita= gross domestic product per capita 
ε = errors specific to the estimation  
α = global constant of the model  
β = independent variable coefficient  
Exppub= total public capital expenses  
 
The results obtained after modeling the statistical data series are the following: 
 
Dependent variable: GDP 
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights) 
Sample: 2000-2006 
Included observations: 7 
Cross-sections included: 26 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 182 
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
_AU--CHE_AU 4.063483 0.632218 6.427350 0.0000 
_BE--CHE_BE 4.938259 1.332634 3.705638 0.0003 
_CY--CHE_CY 224.1988 18.35435 12.21502 0.0000 
_DA--CHE_DA 43.55793 1.704418 25.55589 0.0000 
_ES--CHE_ES 165.1360 18.01163 9.168299 0.0000 
_FL--CHE_FL 53.12300 2.979777 17.82784 0.0000 
_FR--CHE_FR 2.174507 0.033092 65.71088 0.0000 
_GE--CHE_GE 0.786215 0.023794 33.04243 0.0000 
_GR--CHE_GR 4.432030 0.502284 8.823757 0.0000 
_NE--CHE_NE 8.964570 0.680106 13.18114 0.0000 
_HU--CHE_HU 3.817782 0.596821 6.396862 0.0000 
_IR--CHE_IR 25.21039 0.901497 27.96502 0.0000 
_IT--CHE_IT 0.735088 0.117342 6.264509 0.0000 
_LE--CHE_LE 21.40204 3.874703 5.523530 0.0000 
_LI--CHE_LI 4.477287 2.990103 1.497369 0.1364 
_LU--CHE_LU 154.9026 8.885294 17.43359 0.0000 
_MA--CHE_MA 141.2098 51.75227 2.728573 0.0071 
_PO--CHE_PO 3.520411 0.519377 6.778148 0.0000 
_POR--CHE_POR 7.216551 0.386619 18.66578 0.0000 
_RO--CHE_RO 2.754289 0.249447 11.04157 0.0000 
_SC--CHE_SC 9.955542 1.546572 6.437166 0.0000 
_SP--CHE_SP 1.600719 0.075430 21.22120 0.0000 
_SL--CHE_SL 39.15579 4.588700 8.533091 0.0000 
_SW--CHE_SW 30.47394 2.356206 12.93348 0.0000 
_UK--CHE_UK 1.314517 0.229374 5.730878 0.0000 
          
 Weighted Statistics   
          
R-squared 0.965358     Mean dependent var 34335.23 
Adjusted R-squared 0.959815     S.D. dependent var 31337.42 
S.E. of regression 6281.961     Sum squared resid 5.92E+09 
F-statistic 174.1656     Durbin-Watson stat 1.626923 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
 Unweighted Statistics   
          
R-squared 0.805469     Mean dependent var 20184.57 
Sum squared resid 5.92E+09     Durbin-Watson stat 1.802260 
     
 Analyzing the results 
 
The determination coefficient R has a very high value (0.96), which proves the validity of the 
model taken into account. Moreover, specific to “pool” type regressions, the Durbin-Watson test  value 
is 1.80 (although there are self-correlations of the residual results to the left) confirms the global quality 
of the model.  
 The stationarity tests for the residual variables suggest that at the level of unitary roots certain 
individual “unit root” type of processes can be identified and, consequently, there are certain systematic 
deviations in the assessments made according to this empirical model. The result of the stationarity test 
reveals that the probability for the series to be non-stationary is very low (this was shown also by the 
ADF and PP tests).   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
Automatic selection of lags based on MHQC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Quadratic Spectral kernel 
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -5.40344  0.0000  26  147 
Breitung t-stat -1.76389  0.0389  26  122 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -0.43749  0.3309  26  147 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  57.1913  0.2256  26  147 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  98.6236  0.0000  26  150 
     
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat  6.73394  0.0000  26  175 
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
On a whole, the quality of the model can be described as satisfactory and it allows formulating 
some conclusions according to the model estimated.  
The results regarding the significance level of the coefficients corresponding to the independent 
variable taken into account (capital expenses) show that for 2 of the 26 countries the estimated 
coefficients of the independent variable are not completely relevant from a statistical point of view. 
These countries are Lithuania and Malta, with the comment that just for Lithuania can be said that in 
the statistical testing we have non-favorable coefficients for an interpretation. The sign of independent 
variable coefficients reveals the type of the connection existing between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable.  
Thus, for all states undergoing the analysis, the results obtained show that between the 
evolution of the gross domestic product and the capital expenses there is a direct relation meaning that, 
in time, an increase of capital spending determines an increase of the gross domestic product per capita. 
The most significant evolution are in Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia that registered, 
during the analyzed interval, a significant growth rate of the gross domestic product per capita. The 
effect of 1 Euro capital public expenditure lead to an even greater growth effects in countries like 
Cyprus, Luxemburg and Malta, but considering the size and population of those countries, the results of 
the study may not suit the policy of the larger countries. Anyway all those results are revealing the 
importance of this type of expenditure but there shouldn’t be neglected the reform of the public 
spending in some developed European Union countries ( Ireland, Finland, Denmark). In highly 
developed countries such as Germany, Italy or Great Britain the influence of capital expenses on the 
GDP per capita is more significant than the influence of total spending, remaining sub-unitary for 
Germany and Italy (0.78 and 0.73, respectively). There should be noticed that during the analyzed 
period the percentage of capital expenditures in the entire public expenditures diminished. 
  
 IV. COCLUSIOS 
 
The conceptualization of the quality of public finance as a multidimensional framework is 
necessary in order to reflect the complex relations between the quality and the economic growth. 
During the last years, the ones that settled the financial policies on the European level highlighted the 
fact that a concentration of the public expenses in areas that stimulate the economic growth and a more 
efficient use of the public resources are key methods for sustaining the economic growth. The strategy 
established in Lisbon for the economic growth and employment refers explicitly to both objectives. 
By using a functional classification, the types of public spending that stimulate economic 
growth vary a lot according to the sample used. Some studies revealed that just education, research-
development and the public infrastructure are areas stimulating the economic growth, while others 
include here the expenses in the health, public order and safety and environment protection areas 
(European Commission, 2003, 2004). 
In our study, we try to reveal the effects of capital spending on economic growth (GDP per 
capita) European Union member states. The gross domestic product per capita and the capital expenses 
(functional classification of public expenses -  “COFOG”) have been obtained by considering the 
Eurostat statistics, the measurement unit for the dependent variable and for the independent one is the 
EURO, while the period of analyze is of 7 years ( 2000-2006) .  
Thus, for all states undergoing the analysis, the results obtained show that between the gross 
domestic product evolution and the capital expenses evolution there is a direct relation meaning that, in 
time, an increase of capital expenses determines an increase of the level of gross domestic product per 
capita. The most significant evolution are in Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia that 
registered a significant growth rate of the gross domestic product per capita. The effect of 1 Euro as 
capital public expenditure determined in Estonia a GDP growth per capita of 165 Euros and in 
Denmark of 43 Euros according to the econometrical testing of our model. All those results are 
revealing the importance of this type of expenditure but there shouldn’t be neglected the reform of the 
public spending which some developed countries of the European Union ( Ireland, Finland, Denmark) 
have implemented in the recent years. 
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